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INSUFFICIENCY OF CREW AT TIME AND PLACE AS
UNSEAWORTHINESS
Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness a seaman may recover compensatory damages against his ship' for personal injuries sustained as a
result of the shipowner's failure to provide an adequate crew. 2 Overall
sufficiency of crew has been the only standard required in the past.
However, in view of Supreme Court holdings3 concerning seamen's
recovery for injuries resulting from defective equipment, it is possible
that the shipowner will, in the future, be required to allocate sufficient
manpower to particular tasks as well as to have a sufficient crew for
the ship as a whole.
Overall sufficiency of crew was required by a majority of the court
4
in the recent case of Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
During the docking of defendant's vessel, S.S. Mormacwind, the third
mate directed James Waldron and Walter Chowaniec, able-bodied
seamen, to let out an additional mooring line. This line was a fit eightinch manila rope weighing over 100 pounds. While Waldron and
Chowaniec were hauling the line across the steel deck Waldron fell
and injured his back.5
There was expert testimony 6 in the district court to the effect that
'As stated in The Osceola, the source of the modern unseaworthiness doctrine:
"[Tihe vessel and her owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for injuries received
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to
supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship." 189 U.S.
158, 175 (1903).
2A shipowner's general duty with respect to seamen is to furnish a vessel, equipment, and crew reasonably fit for their intended use. The duty is independent of
the exercise of due care. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939);
Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124, 128 (1936); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110
(1936); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158 (1903); The H.A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cit. 1937). The shipowner's
actual or constructive knowledge or control over the unseaworthy condition is not
essential to his liability. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953);
Balado v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 179 F.2d 943 (2d Cit. 1950); cf., Misurella v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The duty is nondelegable, Dixon
v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cit. 1955); continuous, Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); and noncontractual, LeGate v. The Panamolga,
221 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1955); Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
However, "while the duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel is an absolute, inalienable, nondelegable and continuing duty of the shipowner it does not make him
an insurer of the safety of his crew." Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc.,
324 F.2d 660, 662-63 (4th Cir. 1963).
3
See, Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
4356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 810 (1966).
5The Mormacwind was adequately manned overall. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1966).
SWaldron's maritime expert, Dewey Darrigan, a licensed captain for 25 years,
testified that the job of carrying the line required 3 or 4 men. Ibid.
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three or four men rather than two were required to carry the line
in order to constitute "safe and prudent seamanship." But the trial
judge refused to submit to the jury Waldron's claim of unseaworthiness7 based on the evidence that the defendant failed to provide adequate manpower for the particular task in which Waldron was injured.
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a twoto-one decision, affirmed. The majority said that "if the shipowner
has furnished a well-manned ship, with a competent crew, there can
be no liability for personal injuries" caused by a nonnegligent order
of an officer of the ship." It is implicit in the court's holding that in
the absence of proof of an officer's incompetence or negligence, overall sufficiency of manpower aboard ship is a complete defense to
liability for unseaworthiness for an injury arising out of shortage of
personnel in the performance of a particular task.
The dissenting judge rejected the view that overall sufficiency is
the only test for unseaworthiness based on sufficiency of crew. The
dissent argued that insufficiency of crew at the time and place of the
injury also establishes a ship's unseaworthiness, regardless of whether
or not the ship as a whole is adequately manned. 9
7
Valdron's claims of negligence and unseaworthiness apart from the one discussed in the text were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the
shipowner. Claims of negligence under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones
Act), 41 Star. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) are customarily tied to claims of unseaworthiness. See, Madsen v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The

Jones Act applied the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,- 35 Stat.
65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1954), to seamen's personal injury

actions (in personam); the fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk are eliminated as complete bars to recovery.
Different statutes of limitation apply to claims of negligence under the Jones
Act and to claims of unseaworthiness. See, Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944); Cummings v. Redeeriaktieb Transatlantic, 144 F. Supp. 422 (E.D.
Pa. 1956).

SSupra note 4, at 251.
9The dissent also argued that the shipowner has a duty to prevent the use of
his equipment in a negligent or unintended manner. This "improper use" theory
has been accepted in certain cases involving longshoremen as a method of circumventing the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Star.
1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1957), which would otherwise prohibit direct action

by a longshoreman against his employer. See, Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d
Cir. 1966); Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Trans. Co., 340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965);
Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964); Scott v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964).

The "improper use" theory is not accepted universally even in cases dealing
with longshoremen. E.g., Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966);
Puddu v. Royal Neth. S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962); Billeci v. United States,

116

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

The requirement of overall sufficiency originated when cargo owners were the chief beneficiaries of the unseaworthiness doctrine. 10 The
doctrine provided cargo owners, who were obviously unable to oversee the actual transit of their cargo, with a remedy for loss or damage
to cargo which did not require proof of negligence. Because of the
predominant concern for overall adequacy aboard ship, the unseaworthiness doctrine focused on the ship as a whole rather than on
crewmen's particular tasks." Dictum in The Osceola,1 2 adopted by
a long line of subsequent cases,'13 established crewmen as the principal beneficiaries of the unseaworthiness doctrine. The change of emphasis from cargo owner to crewman brought about a shift in the
focus of the doctrine from the ship as a whole to particular tasks
aboard ship, especially those involving equipment. 4
The overall sufficiency standard with respect to equipment was
first attacked in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 15 in which the Supreme
Court held a shipowner liable for his failure to furnish reasonably
fit gear at the time and place of its use. As stated in Mahnich, "[T] he
exacting requirement that the vessel or the owner must provide the
seaman with seaworthy appliances with which to do his work, likewise
requires that safe appliances be furnished when and where the work
is to be done." 16 In Mahnich, the Court expressly rejected the defense
that defendant's ship was adequately equipped overall. 1 7 Mahnich was
injured when he fell from staging that collapsed upon the parting of
defective rope selected by the mate. Sufficient supplies of proper
298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); Arena v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.

1960); Goodrich v. Cargo Ships & Tankers, Inc. 241 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. La. 1965).
10See, The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895); The Ethel, 8 Fed. Cas. 798 (No. 4540)
(D.E.D.N.Y. 1871); Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379 (1878); The Gentleman, 10
Fed. Cas. 190 (No. 5324) (D.S.D.N.Y. 1845). For historical background, see generally, Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CoRN. L.Q. 381 (1954); Lucas, Flood Tide: Some Irrelevant History of the
Admiralty, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 249, 299.

"Judge Peters in Walton v. The Neptune, 29 Fed. Cas. 142 (No. 17135) (D.
Pa. 1800), discusses the ancient codes and concludes that they imposed no duty
upon the shipowner to furnish a fit ship for the benefit of seamen, and that those
codes governed American maritime law.
12189 U.S. 158 (1903).
13E.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Mahich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S.
255 (1922); The H. A. Scrandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).

14Supra note 2. By statute the shipowner's obligation to the cargo owner,
however, is merely "to exercise due diligence . . . to make [the] vessel seaworthy. .. "Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. S 190 (1958).
15321 U.S. 96 (1944).
16ld. at 103.
171bid.
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quality rope were aboard ship, but because such proper rope was
not used when and where rope of that quality was required, the ship
was rendered unseaworthy. The significant fact is that the ship was
rendered unseaworthy because Mahnich was given defective rope irrespective of whether proper rope could have been given him. Just
as cargo owners did not have to prove how their goods were lost
or damaged, the seaman in Mahnich was not required to prove how
the rope became defective or in what manner he acquired it. Mahnich
represented a giant step towards enlarging the shipowner's duty to
crewmen, but the rationale of its holding that the owner is liable for
defects at a particular "time and place" has been confined to cases
involving defective equipment, and has not been extended to cases
involving crew.' 8 Such a narrow construction of the time and place
doctrine is hardly in keeping with the Supreme Court's consideration
of the unseaworthiness doctrine as derived from and shaped to meet
the hazards of the seaman's employment. In Reed v. Yaka the Supreme
Court referred to "[T]he hazards of marine service, the helplessness
of the men to ward off the perils of unseaworthiness, the harshness of
forcing them to shoulder their losses alone, and the broad range of the
'humanitarian policy' of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. .

. ."

19

Aside from consideration of the humanitarian policy there is no
clear case precedent for applying the time and place test to cases
involving crew. There are only two other reported cases, besides
Waldron, involving the question of the allocation of insufficient crew
at a particular time and place. Neither case adopted the time and
place rationale suggested by the Waldron dissent, although the more
recent of the two reached what might be called a time and place re20
sult. The Magdapur,
a pre-Mahnich case, was given primary weight
by the majority in Waldron because it decided the precise question
presented in Waldron. In The Magdapur, one of three crewmen
ordered to take in a mooring wire was injured when a turn of the
wire flipped up and struck him. The court stated that:
Seaworthiness doubtless comprehends the providing of an adequate and competent crew, and it has always been the rule that
a seaman who suffers personal injuries from unseaworthiness may
recover damages .... But the facts here show that at the time the
18Mr. Justice Douglas stated that there is "no reason to draw a line between the
ship and the gear on the one hand and the ship's personnel on the other."
Boudoin
v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339 (1955).
19Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 413 (1963).
203

F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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libelant was hurt there were men enough on the vessel to do the
work at hand.... The error was that of the chief officer in assigning to the particular task too few of the men available for
work. It cannot be said that the ship was undermanned at the
time.

21

In American President Lines, Ltd. v. Redfern,22 the watch officer
ordered Redfem to open the large manual gate valves near the bottom
of the hull, an operation that normally required two men.23 In struggling alone to open one of the valves, Redfern "popped his shoulder."
The ship as a whole was adequately manned.2 4 But Redfern recovered
in the lower court, and his recovery was affirmed on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit, which held that defendant's ship "was not reasonably
fit for service because she was improperly manned-'a classic case of
an unseaworthy vessel.' "25 The court relied exclusively on June T.,
Inc. v. King, 6 but that case merely held that overall insufficiency of
manpower aboard ship renders the ship unseaworthy. No issue as to in27
sufficiency of crew at a particular task was presented in June T.
Although its holding was obscured by a misinterpretation of the
"classic" case, Redfern reached a time and place result. The court intimated that Redfern had been given a defective crew: "A stuck sea
valve . . . is suitable only if operated by 2 men; otherwise, it constitutes a dangerous condition." 28 The court further observes that "Redfern sustained personal injuries because of the dangerous condition." 29
These cryptic statements virtually made the shipowner an insurer of
the safety of the crew members. Whether the court intended to go
that far is not clear, especially in view of its muddled interpretation
of June T. Nevertheless, Redfern's holding, that an insufficient allocation of crewmen to perform a particular task renders the ship unseaworthy, is compatible with Mahnich and its "humanitarian" thrust.
If the unseaworthiness doctrine is to apply to crewmen at all, they,
21id. at 972.
22345 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1965).
23d. at 631.
2

4There was no claim of any overall shipboard shortage of manpower.

25345 F.2d at 632.
26290 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1961)

(one crew member left the ship, leaving only

2 men to handle the cables in which plaintiff lost 3 fingers).
27
See, DeLima v. Trinidad Corp., 302 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1962); Madsen v. United
States, supra note 7; Scheffiler v. Moran Towing & Trans. Co., 68 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1933); In re Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 130 Fed. 76 (9th Cir. 1904); The Gentleman,
supra note 10.
28345 F.2d at 631.
291bid.

